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NetSketch is a tool for the specification of constrained-flow networks (CFNs) and the certification
of desirable safety properties imposed thereon, conceived to assist system integrators in modeling and
design. It provides compositional analysis capabilities based on a strongly-typed domain-specific
language (DSL) for describing and reasoning about CFNs and relevant invariants. Users can model
or design individual network components and perform manual or automated whole-system analysis
of the properties thereof. Users can also assemble many instances of these components into larger
networks, relying on NetSketch’s less precise but more tractable compositional analysis capabilities.
This ability to trade “precision of analysis” for “feasibility of analysis” according to available re-
sources is among the novel features of NetSketch. In earlier work we illustrated how NetSketch is
applied to actual domains [6], and provided a formal definition of its underlying formalism [7].
While the NetSketch DSL provides automatic compositional analysis capabilities for modeling
and designing entire networks, users may need to employ a wider variety of tools and techniques
when modeling and designing individual network components. These can include common tools
for reasoning about systems of constraints of various classes (such as linear constraints, quadratic
constraints, and so on), as well as logical systems and ontologies that deal with concepts relevant to
the application domain. We integrate the AARTIFACT [14] lightweight automated assistant for formal
reasoning (which has also been applied in proving the soundness of the NetSketch formalism [15])
as a tool for modeling and designing individual network components. We present use cases within
the context of an example application of the NetSketch DSL that demonstrate how the automated as-
sistant provides NetSketch users with both an interface for reasoning formally about constraints, and
a straightforward way to implicitly employ a rich domain-specific ontology of logical propositions.
This allows users to verify common properties of constraints and constraint sets, and to reason about
constraint relationships using automatically verifiable algebraic manipulations.
1 Introduction and Background
Many large-scale, safety-critical systems can be viewed at least in part as constrained-flow networks
(CFNs). That is, they can be viewed as interconnections of subsystems, or modules, each of which is
a producer, consumer, or regulator of flows. These flows are characterized by a set of variables and a
set of constraints thereof, reflecting inherent or assumed properties or rules governing how the modules
operate (and what constitutes safe operation). Our notion of flow encompasses streams of physical
entities (e.g., vehicles on a road, fluid in a pipe), data objects (e.g., sensor network packets or video
frames), or consumable resources (e.g., electric energy or compute cycles).
Current practices in the assembly of such systems involve the integration of various subsystems into
a whole by “system integrators” who may not possess expertise or knowledge of the internals of the
subsystems on which they rely. NetSketch [6] is a tool for the specification of CFNs and the certification
of desirable safety properties imposed on such networks. NetSketch assists system integrators in two
types of activities: modeling and design. As a modeling tool, NetSketch enables the abstraction of
an existing (flow network) system while retaining sufficient information about it to carry out future
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analysis of safety properties. As a design tool, NetSketch enables the exploration of alternative safe
designs as well as the identification of minimal requirements for missing subsystems in partial designs.
Formal analysis is at the heart of both of the above modeling and design activities. In earlier work we
overview NetSketch, highlight its salient features, illustrate how a prototype tool could be used in actual
applications [6] and provide a formal definition of its underlying formalism [7].
In related work [7], we present more extensively the background and motivation underlying Net-
Sketch and its underlying formalism, and we refer the reader interested in learning more about this
formalism to these materials. Below, we briefly introduce the NetSketch formalism and then discuss the
role of an automated assistant, an essential component of any NetSketch implementation.
The NetSketch Formalism. Support for safety analysis in design and/or development tools such as
NetSketch is based on sound formalisms that are not specific to (and do not require expertise in) partic-
ular domains. NetSketch enables the composition of exact analyses of small subsystems by adopting a
constrained-flow network formalism that exposes the tradeoffs between exactness of analysis and scal-
ability of analysis. This is done using a strongly-typed domain-specific language (DSL) for describing
and reasoning about CFNs at various levels of “sketchiness” (precision) along with invariants that need
to be enforced thereupon. This DSL has a formal definition, and its type system has been proven sound
relative to appropriately-defined notions of validity [7].
There are a few essential concepts that constitute our formalism for compositional analysis of prob-
lems involving constrained-flow networks. The formalism provides a language for defining networks –
graphs consisting of nodes and edges. Networks are constructed out of many instances of defined mod-
ules (small network components). These are also graphs but are typically of a size that is sufficiently
small for a complete or exhaustive analysis. The formalism provides means for defining such modules
and assembling them into networks. If an analysis of the network is desired, it may be possible to take
advantage of this modularity by analyzing the components individually in a more precise manner (using
an automated assistant, as discussed further below), and then composing the results to analyze the entire
network (using the compositional analysis capabilities of the formalism). Analyses are represented using
a language of constraints. If the engineer considers flows across a network of modules, the relevant
parameters describing this flow (e.g., the number of open lanes on a highway, or the throughput of a
network link) can be mathematically constrained for each instance of a module. These constraints can
model both limitations of modules and problems the engineer must solve.
Thus, the formalism consists of two intertwined languages: one for describing networks composed
of modules, and another for describing constraints governing flows across the network components. In
order to ensure that our system works correctly “under the hood”, a precise semantics for these languages
is defined, along with a rigorous notion of what it means for an analysis of a network to be “correct”.
Module Design and Analysis with an Automated Assistant. The NetSketch DSL and formalism pro-
vide a means by which to perform compositional analysis of entire networks of modules (the NetSketch
“Sketch Mode” in Fig. 1), and in Section 2 we present the inference rules that enable this capability.
However, the formalism’s compositional analysis capabilities do not address the issue of individual mod-
ule construction (the NetSketch “Base Mode” in Fig. 1). The latter involves manipulation of common
mathematical concepts such as dimensions, sets, graphs, constraints, and (in)equations. Furthermore, the
constraints commonly found in a particular domain might be of certain classes (such as linear constraints,
quadratic constraints, and so on), and thus could effectively be analyzed and solved by particular tools
and techniques from a broader collection of tools for solving systems of constraints of various classes.
Consequently, the tool must leverage a varied collection of existing systems and formalisms. There are
many reference textbooks and survey papers to draw on given the task of assembling and using such
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tools [17, 12, 23, 13]).
An automated assistant can help a user manage these formal and mathematical concepts when mod-
eling or assembling individual modules. The automated assistant provides an accessible and lightweight
interface that allows the user to (1) represent and manipulate common concepts in the domain of appli-
cation, (2) access and leverage an extensive ontology of definitions and facts about these concepts, (3)
utilize a variety of tools and algorithms that operate on these concepts.
In this work, we integrate the NetSketch DSL with AARTIFACT 1, a lightweight automated assis-
tant for formal reasoning [14] (which has also been applied in proving the soundness of the NetSketch
formalism [15]). The AARTIFACT system provides a familiar concrete syntax for common mathemat-
ical concepts that overlaps with English, MediaWiki markup, and LATEX. The system’s flexible parser
allows the user to employ a selection of LATEX constructs for mathematical notation, to use predicates
represented as natural language phrases, and to introduce her own constants and infix operators. It is the
automated assistant’s responsibility to recognize whether a particular manipulation is valid based on the
system’s ability to utilize the algorithms, underlying tools, and ontologies integrated within it.
An automated assistant for formal reasoning can provide several useful capabilities (see Fig. 1). It
can provide an interface for the variety of tools a domain expert may want to employ while modeling or
assembling CFNs. Specifically, it can leverage domain-specific ontologies of relevant propositions and
concepts in helping a domain expert manipulate and reason about constraint collections. This includes
(1) checking the sorts (i.e. dimensions) of subexpressions within complex constraints, (2) identifying
the classes to which a constraint belongs (and invoking appropriate solvers), (3) reasoning algebraically
about relationships between constraints (with support for a symbolic manipulation and evaluation).
Figure 1: The two-tiered NetSketch modelling and assessment process, with automated assistant support.
2 Overview of the NetSketch Formalism
We describe the generic formal framework underlying the NetSketch DSL; a more detailed presentation
can be found in previous work [5].
1Source code (for a Haskell implementation) and a demonstration version of the general-purpose automated assistant,
integrated with the MediaWiki online content management system, is available at http://www.aartifact.org.
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M ,N ,P ∈ RAWCFNS ::= A module name
∣ X hole name
∣ conn(θ ,M ,N ) θ ⊆1-1 Out(M )× In(N )
∣ loop(θ ,M ) θ ⊆1-1 Out(M )× In(M )
∣ let X∈ {M1, . . . ,Mn} in N X occurs once in N
Figure 2: Syntax of raw untyped CFNs.
Constraints and Types. We denote by ℕ the set of natural numbers. X = {x0,x1,x2, . . .} is a count-
ably infinite set of parameters. The set of expressions and constraints over ℕ and X can be defined
using an extended BNF notation, in a style borrowed from the foundations of programming languages:
e ∈ EXP ::= n ∣ x ∣ e1 ∗ e2 ∣ e1 + e2 ∣ e1− e2 ∣ . . .
c ∈ CONST ::= e1 = e2 ∣ e1 < e2 ∣ e1 ⩽ e2 ∣ . . .
While we restrict CONST to equalities and inequalities, future extensions will introduce more complex
constraints.2 Of special interest are linear constraints, obtained by restricting the definitions for CONST:
e ∈ LINEXP ::= n ∣ x ∣ n∗ x ∣ e1 + e2
c ∈ LINCONST ::= e1 = e2 ∣ e1 < e2 ∣ e1 ⩽ e2
Constraints in CONST characterize the internal workings of a system, be it at the level of a small module
or a large network. Such constraints reflect what we call the internal safety-critical properties of the
system. Constraints in LINCONST are to be inferred and/or checked against the internal constraints.
Depending on the application, the parameters in X can be associated with particular sorts expressed
in relevant units of measurement. For example, in modeling vehicular traffic networks, X has parameters
of sorts such as traffic velocity (km/hr) and traffic density (T/km). An automated assistant can then infer
the sorts of expressions, as described in Section 3.
Types (i.e., boundary constraints, be it for modules, subsystems, or whole systems) are drawn from
LINCONST (or a restricted and more tractable subset thereof). Types can be as simple as intervals, e.g.,
n1 ⩽ x ⩽ n2 for some natural numbers n1 and n2. For brevity, we do not distinguish between types
and other constraints in LINCONST. Types should be simple enough so that their manipulation is not
prohibitively costly, but expressive enough that their satisfaction ensures some desirable safety invariants.
Modules and Holes. We specify an untyped module A by a four-tuple (A , In,Out,Con) where A
is the module name and In, Out, and Con are the finite sets of input parameters, output parameters and
internal constraints of A , respectively. We require that In∩Out=∅ and In∪Out ⊆ parameters(Con),
where parameters(Con) is the set of parameters occurring in Con, possibly larger than In∪Out. An un-
typed network hole is a triple: (X , In,Out) where X is the hole name, In is a finite set of input parameters,
and Out is a finite set of output parameters. There are no internal constraints associated with a hole.
We are careful in adding the name of the module, A , to its specification; in our formal setup we want
to be able to refer to the module by its name without the overhead of the rest of its specification. By a
slight abuse of notation, we may write informally A = (A , In,Out,Con) and X = (X , In,Out).
Untyped CFNs. An untyped CFN is written as (M , I,O,C ), where I and O are the sets of input and
output parameters, and C is a finite set of finite constraint sets. M is not a name but an expression
2These can include conditional, negated, or time-dependent constraints, and others, possibly over domains other than ℕ.
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built up from: (1) module names, (2) hole names, and (3) the constructors conn, loop and let-in.3
We may refer to such a CFN by just writing the expression M or, more fully, by writing it with its
three omitted parts (M , I,O,C ) – the context dictates which of the two to use. For such an untyped
CFN M , we define In(M ) as I (the omitted input parameters) and Out(M ) as O (the omitted output
parameters). More precisely, the syntax of raw untyped CFNs is given in extended BNF in Figure 2. We
write θ ⊆1-1 Out(M )× In(N ) to denote a partial one-one map from Out(M ) to In(N ). (If the set of
parameters is sorted with more than one sort then θ must respect sorts.
In an expression “let X∈ {M1, . . . ,Mn} in N ”, we call “X ∈ {M1, . . . ,Mn}” a binding for the hole
X and “N ” the scope of this binding. Informally, the idea is that all of the CFNs in {M1, . . . ,Mn} can
be interchangeably placed in the hole X , depending on changing conditions of operation in the CFN as a
whole. If a hole X occurs in a CFN M outside the scope of any let-binding, we say X is free in M . If
there are no free occurrences of holes in M , we say that M is closed.
The expressions defined by the preceding BNF syntax are said to specify “raw” CFNs because they
ignore how input parameters I, output parameters O, and internal constraints C of a CFN M are as-
sembled from those of its constituent parts. There are formal rules for this purpose, shown in Figure 3.
Justification and further elaboration of these rules are in our report [5]. In rules CONNECT and LET, the
parameters of the constituent components – M and N in CONNECT, M1, . . . ,Mn and N in LET – are
pairwise disjoint sets; this is achieved by parameter renaming (already indicated by the side-condition of
rule MODULE) so that each separate component in a CFN has its own private set of parameters. Note
there is no need to freshly rename the parameters of a hole X , in rule HOLE, because we assume X occurs
exactly once in a CFN (in this presentation), whereas we impose no such restriction on the number of
occurrences of a module A .
Rule CONNECT takes two untyped CFNs, M and N , and returns an untyped CFN conn(θ ,M ,N )
where some of the output parameters in M are unified with some of the input parameters in N , ac-
cording to what θ prescribes. Rule LOOP takes one untyped CFN, M , and returns an untyped CFN
loop(θ ,M ) where some output parameters in M are identified with some input parameters in M ac-
cording to θ .
Rule LET allows any of n⩾ 1 untyped CFNs {M1, . . . ,Mn} to be placed in a hole X of an untyped
CFN N . Each Mk, for 1⩽ k⩽ n, which is placed in X gives rise to a different set of internal constraints
for N . (This explains why the specification of an untyped CFN involves a finite collection C of finite
constraint sets rather than a single finite constraint set.) In the side-condition of rule LET, the maps ϕ
and ψ are bijections. If parameters are multi-sorted, then ϕ and ψ must respect sorts, i.e., if ϕ(x) = y
then both x and y must be of the same sort, e.g., both velocity parameters, or both density parameters,
etc., and similarly for ψ .4
Pre- and Post-Conditions. A typing or a typed specification for an untyped CFN M is an expression
of the form (M : C∗) or, if fully spelled out,
(
(M , I,O,C ) : C∗
)
where C∗ is a finite set of linear
constraints over In(M )∪Out(M ) = I ∪O. As it stands, a typing (M : C∗) may or may not be valid.
The validity of typed specifications presumes a formal definition of the semantics of CFNs, which we
discuss after the rules for building typed CFNs.
3We may add other constructors according to need. There are also alternative constructors. For example, instead of conn,
we may introduce par (for parallel composition of two CFN’s). Conversely, par can be expressed using conn (using θ =∅).
4Caution: What we define here is a DSL (domain specific language) for design and analysis of large-scale CFNs. The
presence of the let-in constructor is reminiscent of a similarly-named feature in some programming languages. However,
beyond the name, the two features are different. In our DSL there is no notion of let-in reduction whereby every let-in is
eliminated by a process of repeated substitutions – although this is possible it also leads to an exponential explosion in the size
of what we envision as already large CFN’s in practice. Our DSL is a specification language, not a programming language to
be compiled into executable code.
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HOLE
(X , In,Out) ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ (X , In,Out,{ })
MODULE
(A , In,Out,Con) module
Γ ⊢ (B, I,O,{C})
(B, I,O,C) = (̀A , In,Out,Con) where (̀ ) denotes a parameter-renaming operator
CONNECT
Γ ⊢ (M , I1,O1,C1) Γ ⊢ (N , I2,O2,C2)
Γ ⊢ (conn(θ ,M ,N ), I,O,C )
θ ⊆1-1 O1×I2, I = I1∪(I2−range(θ)),O = (O1−domain(θ))∪O2
C = {C1∪C2∪{ p = q ∣(p,q) ∈ θ }∣C1 ∈ C1,C2 ∈ C2}
LOOP
Γ ⊢ (M , I1,O1,C1)
Γ ⊢ (loop(θ ,M ), I,O,C )
θ ⊆1-1 O1× I1, I = I1−range(θ), O = O1−domain(θ)
C = {C1∪{ p = q ∣(p,q) ∈ θ }∣C1 ∈ C1}
LET
Γ ⊢ (Mk, Ik,Ok,Ck) for 1⩽ k ⩽ n Γ∪{(X , In,Out)} ⊢ (N , I,O,C )
Γ ⊢
(




C∪Ĉ∪{ p = ϕ(p) ∣ p ∈ Ik }∪{ p = ψ(p) ∣ p ∈ Ok }
∣∣∣1⩽ k ⩽ n,C ∈ C , Ĉ ∈ Ck, ϕ : Ik→ In, ψ : Ok→Out}
Figure 3: Specifying the input parameters I, output parameters O, and internal constraints C .
Let C be a finite set of constraints and Y = parameters(C). A valuation V of Y is a total map from Y
to ℕ. Satisfaction of C by V is defined in the usual way and written V ∣=C. Let C′ be another finite set of
constraints over Y . We say C implies C′, in symbols C ⇒ C′, if every valuation satisfying C also satisfies
C′. The closure of C is the set of all constraints implied by C, i.e., closure(C) = {c ∈ CONST ∣C ⇒ {c}}.
Let C be a constraint set and Z a set of parameters. We define two restrictions of C relative to Z :
C ↾Z = {c ∈C ∣parameters(c)⊆Z } and C ⇂Z = {c ∈C ∣parameters(c)∩Z ∕=∅}.
That is, (C ↾Z ) is the set of constraints in C where only parameters from Z occur, and (C ⇂Z ) is the
set of constraints in C with at least one occurrence of a parameter from Z . Let M = (M , I,O,C ) be an
untyped CFN and (M : C∗) a typing for M . We partition closure(C∗) into two subsets as follows:
pre(M : C∗) = closure(C∗) ↾ I and post(M : C∗) = closure(C∗)−pre(M : C∗) = closure(C∗) ⇂ O
While the parameters of pre(M : C∗) are all in I, the parameters of post(M : C∗) are not necessarily
all in O, as some constraints in C∗ may contain both input and output parameters. The pre-condition of
(M : C∗) involves only input parameters; the post-condition of (M : C∗) may involve both input and
output parameters.5
Typed CFNs. We define typed specifications by the same inference rules we already used to derive
untyped specifications, but now augmented with type information. To save space here, we show two of
these type-augmented rules, CONNECT and LET, together with an additional one WEAKEN in Figure 4.
As the exhibited CONNECT and LET elaborate the rules by the same names in Figure 3, we omit some
of the side conditions and mention only the parts that are necessary for inserting the types. Further
explanation about these rules and the omitted rules are in our report [5].
In Figure 4, we place the crucial side-condition for each rule in a framed box; this condition expresses
a relationship that must be satisfied by the “derived types” (linear constraints) in the premises of the rule.
For later reference, we call this side-condition (Ct) in CONNECT, (Lt) in LET, and (Wn) in WEAKEN.
5Both pre(C∗) and post(C∗) are infinite sets. In an implementation, we need to efficiently compute “canonical finite bases”
for pre(C∗) and post(C∗) in order to then efficiently decide questions such as: is a certain type c in pre(C∗), i.e., implied by the
latter’s finite basis? Does post(C∗) imply pre(C∗), i.e., does the finite basis of the first imply that of the second? And others.
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CONNECT
Γ ⊢ (M , I1,O1,C1) : C∗1 Γ ⊢ (N , I2,O2,C2) : C∗2
Γ ⊢ (conn(θ ,M ,N ), I,O,C ) : C∗
θ⊆1-1 O1× I2, I = I1∪ (I2−range(θ)), O = (O1−domain(θ))∪O2,C∗ = (C∗1 ∪C∗2) ↾ (I∪O),
(Ct) post(M : C∗1)⇒ {x = y∣(x,y) ∈ θ}∪ (pre(N : C∗2) ⇂ range(θ))
LET
Γ ⊢ (Mk, Ik,Ok,Ck) : C∗k for 1⩽ k ⩽ n Γ∪{(X , In,Out) : Con
∗} ⊢ (N , I,O,C ) : C∗
Γ ⊢
(
let X∈ {M1, . . . ,Mn} in N , I,O,C ′
)
: C∗
for all 1⩽ k ⩽ n and pairs of bijections (ϕ,ψ) : (Ik,Ok)→ (In,Out):
(Lt) C∗k ⇔
(
Con∗ ∪ {x = ϕ(x) ∣x ∈ Ik } ∪ {x = ψ(x) ∣x ∈ Ok }
)
WEAKEN
Γ ⊢ (M , I,O,C ) : C∗1
Γ ⊢ (M , I,O,C ) : C∗
(Wn) pre(M : C∗1) ⇐ pre(M : C∗) and post(M : C∗1) ⇒ post(M : C∗)
Figure 4: Three of the typing rules for CFNs.
There are different versions of rule LET depending on the side condition (Lt) – the weaker the side
condition, the more powerful the rule, i.e., the more CFNs for which it can derive a type. The simplest
way of formulating LET, as shown in Figure 4, makes (Lt) most restrictive. However, in the presence of
WEAKEN, (Lt) is far less restrictive than it appears; it allows to adjust the derived types and constraints
of the CFNs in {M1, . . . ,Mn} in order to satisfy (Lt), if possible by weakening them. Rule WEAKEN
requires the pre-condition be strengthened and/or the post-condition be weakened in order that the typing
of M be weakened.
Validity and Soundness. There are different ways of defining the satisfaction of a typed specification
(M : C∗) – or, fully spelled out,
(
(M , I,O,C ) : C∗
)
– by a valuation V of I. We choose a particular way
that is suitable for purposes of illustration. Another, called weak satisfaction, is in our report [5], and
there are others still, depending on the applications.
We say valuation V satisfies (M : C∗) and write V ∣= (M : C∗) to mean:
∙ if V ∣= pre(C∗) then, for every valuation V ′ ⊇V of I∪O∪parameters(C ) and for every C ∈ C ,
if V ′ ∣=C then V ′ ∣= post(C∗).
Informally, V satisfies (M : C∗) in case, if V satisfies pre(C∗) and V ′ is an extension of V satisfying the
internal constraints of M , then V ′ satisfies post(C∗). We say (M : C∗) is valid if:
∙ for every valuation V of I, it holds that V ∣= (M : C∗), in which case we also write ∣= (M : C∗).
Informally, (M : C∗) is valid in case, for every input flow satisfying pre(C∗) and for every way of
channelling the flow through M , consistent with its internal constraints, post(C∗) is satisfied. The
following soundness result shows that derivability of a typed specification implies its validity:6
∙ if Γ ⊢M : C∗ can be derived by the typing rules (three of them shown in Fig. 4), then ∣= (M : C∗).
The proof of this result [5] holds for the particular notion of validity defined above .
6This is similar to a type system for a strongly-typed programming language. A sound type system is one that is not too
lenient: it rejects all invalid programs that violate desirable invariant properties (possibly in addition to some valid programs).
A complete type system accepts all valid programs, possibly in addition to some invalid ones. For non-trivial (i.e., Turing-
complete) programming languages, type systems are sound but not complete.
7
Safe Compositional Network Sketches: Automated Assistance Lapets, Kfoury, and Bestavros
3 A NetSketch Use Case and the Automated Assistant
We consider an example of a CFN scenario suitable for analysis using the NetSketch DSL: a vehicular
traffic problem, inspired by problems in the study of traffic flow [20]. We focus on how an automated
assistant can be useful for an engineer who is modeling modules in a domain such as this. A more
extensive examination of this example, including how the engineer in this scenario would assemble
networks out of many typed module instances, is examined more in a pertinent report [5]. The examples
in this discussions are simple and only illustrate the use of an automated assistant; more extensive and
sophisticated examples can be found in the full technical report describing this work [16].
Format of Presentation. Formal definitions and arguments parsed by the AARTIFACT system are pre-
sented within a framed box (example provided below).
Assert for any x,y,z ∈ ℝ, if x > y and y > z then x > z.
Traffic Flow Example. An engineer working for a metropolitan traffic authority has the following
problem. Her city lies on a river bank across from the suburbs, and every morning hundreds of thousands
of motorists drive across a few bridges to work in the city center. Each bridge has a fixed number of lanes,
but they are all reversible (an operator can decide how many lanes are available to inbound and outbound
traffic at different times of the day). The engineer must decide how many inbound lanes should be open
in the morning with the goal of ensuring that no backups occur within the city center, with the secondary
goal of maximizing the amount of traffic that can enter the city. The city street grid is a network of a
large number of only a few distinct kinds of traffic junctions, such as the merge junction described below.
The junction and the problem the engineer must solve locally within it is modelled as a module.
Derivation of Sorts for Constraint Subexpressions. The capabilities of an automated assistant are
a strict superset of the capabilities of a type inference algorithm, so it is natural to task the automated
assistant with deriving and verifying the sorts of any expressions within the constraints introduced by
the user. In order to model the notion of “no backups”, it is necessary to utilize two sorts of parameters:
density measured in tons per kilometer (T/km), and velocity measured in kilometers per hour (km/hr).
We consider an example of a module. A merge junction has two incoming links (call them 1 and
2) and one outgoing link (call it 3). This traffic junction can be modelled using a module (call it AM)
consisting of a single node (call it M) for which the formal definition is:
N ={M}, In= {1,2},Q =∅,Out= {3}
Par ={1 7→ (v1,d1),2 7→ (v2,d2),3 7→ (v3,d3)}
Con={regulating traffic through M}∪{lower/upper bounds on vi,di}
This definition specifies the structure of the junction, with the constraint set Con only containing prede-
fined constraints that are required for all merge junctions:
(1) d1 +d2 = d3; (2) d1 ∗ v1 +d2 ∗ v2 ≤ d3 ∗ v3
Constraint (1) enforces conservation of density when M is neither a “sink” nor a “source”, whereas
constraint (2) encodes the non-decreasing flow invariant, namely that traffic along the exit link may
accelerate or become more dense.
When the two constraints are introduced, the automated assistant automatically derives sorts for
each subexpression, as well as the correctness (and thus meaningfulness) of the overall constraint. For
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example, because the dimension associated with both d1 and d2 is T/km, the dimension associated with
d1 + d2 is also T/km. Because T/km is the dimension associated with the expressions on both sides of
the constraint, (1) is validated as a well-sorted constraint. Furthermore, in constraint (2), because d2 is
T/km and v2 is km/hr, v2 ∗d2 is T/hr (called mass flow).
Symbolic Verification of Relationships between Constraints. Suppose that the user introduces two
more constraints that represent an upper bound k on the increase in traffic density on the outgoing link:
(3) d3 ≤ d1 + k; (4) d3 ≤ d2 + k.
Together with constraints (1) and (2), these constraints have some noteworthy consequences for the
module M that can be derived using a few algebraic manipulations:
Assert d3 ≤ d1 + k, d1 +d2 ≤ d1 + k, and d2 ≤ k.
Assert d3 ≤ d2 + k, d1 +d2 ≤ d2 + k, and d1 ≤ k.
Thus, these constraints in fact put an upper bound on the traffic density over incoming links. Now,
suppose the user introduces two more constraints,
(5) d3 ≥ d1 +d2 (6) v3 ≥ v1 + v2,
and wishes to know whether these guarantee that kinetic energy (km ⋅T/hr2) is preserved:
(7) v23 ∗d3 ≥ v21 ∗d1 + v21 ∗d2.
This, too, can be verified using a sequence of algebraic manipulations.
Assert v23 ∗d3 ≥ (v1 + v2)2 ∗d3,
(v1 + v2)2 ∗d3 ≥ v21 ∗d3 + v22 ∗d3 +2∗ v1 ∗ v2 ∗d3,
v21 ∗d3 + v22 ∗d3 +2∗ v1 ∗ v2 ∗d3 ≥ v21 ∗d3 + v22 ∗d3,
d3 ≥ d1 and d3 ≥ d2,
v21 ∗d3 + v22 ∗d3 ≥ v21 ∗d1 + v22 ∗d2,
v23 ∗d3 ≥ v21 ∗d1 + v22 ∗d2.
Derivation of Constraint Class. A capability closely related to sort derivation is the derivation of
constraint class. For example, simple syntactic propositions can be used to conclude that (1),(3),(4),(5),
and (6) are linear constraints, (2) is a quadratic constraint, and (7) is a cubic constraint. Automated
derivation of a constraint’s class is useful in determining what algorithms can be applied to characterize
the solution space for a set of constraints.
In its most simple incarnation, this capability can be accomplished through a trivial, superficial anal-
ysis of the syntactic structure of an expression.
Assert d1 = d2 +d3 is a linear constraint.
Assert d1 ∗ v1 ≤ d2 ∗ v2 +d3 ∗ v3 is a quadratic constraint.
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Evaluation-based Verification of Relationships between Constraints. It is also possible to leverage
the capabilities of the automated assistant in evaluating constraints on specified ranges. The automated
assistant can call appropriate constraint solvers as subroutines in order to accomplish this, or it can simply
act as a calculator and perform an exhaustive evaluation of all possibilities within fixed ranges for the
parameters involved.
Consider a crossing junction that has two incoming links (call them 1 and 2) and two outgoing links
(call them 3 and 4). The corresponding gadget (call it AX) again has a single node, call it X, defined as
follows:
N ={X}, In= ⟨1,2⟩,Q =∅,Out= ⟨3,4⟩
Par ={1 7→ v1 ⋅d1,2 7→ v2 ⋅d2,3 7→ v3 ⋅d3,4 7→ v4 ⋅d4}
Con=Connodes∪Conlinks where
Connodes = {regulating traffic through X}
Conlinks = {lower/upper bounds on v1,d1 . . .}
Suppose all traffic entering through link 1 must exit through link 3 and at the same velocity, and all
traffic entering through link 2 must exit through link 4 and at the same velocity. This is expressed by four
constraints:
v1 = v3; v2 = v4; d1 = d3; d2 = d4
If the total density of entering traffic, namely d1+d2, exceeds a “jam density” that makes the two entering
traffics block each other, there will be backups. We therefore presume there is an upper bound, say 10,
on d1 +d2 below which the two traffics do not impede each other and there are no backups as a result:
d1 +d2 ⩽ 10
Below a total density of 10, we can imagine that the two incoming traffics are sparse enough so that they
smoothly alternate taking turns to pass through the crossing junction.
We can perform a simple verification that {0, . . . ,5} is a valid range for the components di simply by
asserting the claim within the automated assistant.
Assert for all d ∈ {0, . . . ,5}4,
d1 = d3, d2 = d4
implies that
d1 +d2 ≤ 10, d3 ∈ {0, . . . ,5} and d4 ∈ {0, . . . ,5}.
4 Related Work and Conclusion
We reviewed the formalism underlying the NetSketch DSL, which can be used to model and assemble
CFNs, and to reason in a compositional manner about constraints on flows through these networks. We
have also illustrated how an automated assistant can help a domain expert using the NetSketch DSL to
define modules within a domain application. The assistant can help her reason about the dimensionality
of constraints, algebraic relationships between constraints, and the classification of constraint sets.
Our formalism for reasoning about constrained-flow networks was inspired by and based upon for-
malisms for reasoning about programs developed over the decades within the programming languages
community. While our work focuses in particular on networks and constraints on flows, there is much
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relevant work in the community addressing the general problem of reasoning about distributed programs.
However, most previously proposed systems for reasoning in general about the behavior of distributed
programs (Process algebra [3], Petri nets [25], Π-calculus [22], finite-state models [18, 19], and model
checking [11]) rely upon the retention of details about the internals of a system’s components in assess-
ing their interactions with one another. While this affords these systems great expressive power, that
expressiveness necessarily carries with it a burden of complexity. There has also been a large interest in
applying custom type systems to domain specific languages (which peaked in the late nineties, e.g., the
USENIX Conference on Domain-Specific Languages (DSL) in 1997 and 1999). Later type systems have
been used to bound other resources such as expected heap space usage (e.g., [10]).
Our work also shares the motivation, philosophy, and approach of earlier attempts to define DSLs for
component-based design [2], [29]. Our work is distinguished by a recognition of the need for network
holes, and an emphasis on the distinction between small module design and large network design.
One of the essential activities our formalism aims to support is reasoning about and finding solution
ranges for sets of constraints that describe properties of a network. In its most general form, this is known
as the constraint satisfaction problem and is widely studied [30]. However, most approaches consider a
homogenous set of constraints of a particular class rather than a potentially varied collection.
One variant of the constraint satisfaction problem relevant to our work involves only linear con-
straints. Finding solutions respecting collections of linear constraints is a classic problem that has been
considered in a large variety of work over the decades. There exists a great deal of established material
[26] including many documented algorithms and many analyses of practical considerations.
The work in this paper extends and generalizes our earlier work in TRAFFIC (Typed Representation
and Analysis of Flows For Interoperability Checks [4]), and complements our earlier work in CHAIN
(Canonical Homomorphic Abstraction of Infinite Network protocol compositions [8]).
The accessible interface of the automated assistant utilized in this work reflects the design principles
of other formal verification systems such as Tutch [1] and Scunak [9]. The need for natural interfaces
(both superficial and functional) in automated verification has been recognized to varying degrees by the
designers of the Tutch proof checker [1], the Scunak mathematical assistant system [9], the ForTheL
language and SAD proof assistant [31], the EPGY Theorem-Proving Environment [21], the ΩMEGA
proof verifier [28], and in the work of Sieg and Cittadini [27]. The ontology-oriented, lightweight verifi-
cation capabilities of the automated assistant are inspired by work in the assembly of large-scale formal
and semi-formal ontologies [24].
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